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DOLS OR QUALITY CARE? 
 
GORDON R. ASHTON OBE, LL.B* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A comprehensive mental capacity jurisdiction was established for England and Wales 
on 1st October 2007 when the Mental Capacity Act 2005 was implemented. Shortly 
prior to this the ‘Bournewood Gap’ was identified when the European Court of Human 
Rights held that there was a breach of the human rights of adults who lacked capacity 
and were deprived of their liberty by the state.1 A legal procedure was required to 
authorise this and in consequence our legislation was amended to introduce 
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (commonly referred to as DoLS) with effect from 1st 
April 2009.2 These applied only to adults resident in hospitals and care homes and 
were found to be insufficient when the Supreme Court held that some adults in 
community settings were also being unlawfully deprived of their liberty.3 A further 
procedure was urgently required and Sir James Munby as President of the Court of 
Protection set up the Re X streamlined, paper-based judicial authorisation procedure 
to cope with the thousands of anticipated applications.4 It is to these two different 
procedures that I refer in this article. 
 
II. A PARENT’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
I first encountered the ‘Bournewood Gap’ before it was even identified. Our son Paul 
was a strapping lad over 6 feet tall with no physical impairments, but he had grown up 
with severe learning disabilities and challenging behaviour that made him increasingly 
difficult to manage. We were determined to achieve a life for him that was not 
dependent on our household which he was likely to outlive. We made strenuous 
attempts to settle him in various care homes and communities (I became a founder of 
one and a trustee of several) but they could not cope with his behaviour and ultimately 
he was sectioned under the Mental Health Act for the purpose of moving him to a 
health authority unit shared with two other young adults (although the section was then 
discharged!). We had never resorted to the use of drugs but he was soon drugged so 
heavily that he could barely stand or converse with us on our visits. Ultimately he died 
there in 2004 at the age of 28 years due to inadequate supervision – there should 
have been at least two carers but on that morning for some reason there was only one 
and he choked to death on his breakfast. 
 
                                                          
* Retired district judge and nominated judge of the Court of Protection. Gordon Ashton draws on his 
experience as a parent and a judge to consider the relevance of deprivation of liberty safeguards in the 
context of the care of adults who lack capacity to make their own decisions but need constant 
supervision, and then outlines his perspective as a potential consumer of the mental capacity 
jurisdiction. 
1  HL v UK (2004) 40 EHRR 761, overturning the decision of the House of Lords in R v Bournewood 
Community and Mental Health NHS Trust ex parte L [1999] AC 458, [1998] 2 FLR 550. 
2 Mental Health Act 2007 which inserted clause 4A and B and Schedules A1 and 1A in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. 
3 P v Cheshire West and Cheshire Council and another; P and Q v Surrey County Council [2014] UKSC 
19, concerning the living arrangements of P, MIG and MEG. 
4 Re X and others (Deprivation of Liberty) [2014] EWCOP 25. 
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How does this relate to Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards?  
 
As parents we were not concerned that our son’s liberty was being restricted – we 
would have been appalled if this had not been so. What concerned us was whether 
the care arrangements were the best that could reasonably be achieved for our son. 
We learnt that this depended on the dedication of carers and the implementation rather 
than wording of the care plan. This justifiably stated that he should not leave the flat 
unless accompanied by two responsible adults, but there were seldom two adults 
available and when my wife wished to take him for a walk there was no-one to 
accompany them. So the reality was that he was confined to a small flat with two others 
needing continuous supervision. 
 
Would the DoLS or Re X procedure have given our son more freedom or saved his 
life? No, because the former only addresses the justification for deprivation of liberty5 
whereas the latter would have found the care plan acceptable on the face of it. This 
might have created an opportunity not otherwise available for us to ventilate our 
concerns about the quality of his lifestyle, but the reality was that no other options were 
then available and the courts could not oblige the authorities to fund something better.  
 
There is now uncertainty as to whether safeguards should apply to care at home where 
there is some involvement of the local authority. During the years that we looked after 
our son we would have found it laughable if anyone had suggested that we were 
depriving him of his liberty in view of his irrational behaviour and lack of awareness, 
and would have felt threatened and undervalued if intrusive reports had to be prepared 
and reviewed at intervals. Of more importance was the extent to which we were 
providing him with opportunities that would not otherwise have been available to him, 
and as parents we looked to the authorities for support not policing. I found myself in 
sympathy with the initial attempt of Sir James Munby to head off the looming disaster 
by adopting the ‘relative normality’ approach whereby arrangements that were normal 
or perhaps inevitable for such an individual did not amount to a deprivation of liberty.6 
 
III. A DISTRICT JUDGE’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
I never aspired to be a judge, but after 28 years in general legal practice my activities 
outside the office motivated by the struggle with our son displeased my partners so 
much that I applied to be a District Judge. I had been a deputy for some years and 
also a part-time chair of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, but was also a member 
of the Law Society’s Mental Health & Disability Committee, lecturing to lawyers and 
charities on disability issues and writing my first book, Mental Handicap & the Law the 
publication of which in 1992 coincided with my appointment. Not only did life on the 
Bench give me more time for these activities but I also found that the judiciary lacked 
awareness of the need to make reasonable adjustments for people with physical, 
sensory and mental impairments. Thus began my long association with the Judicial 
Studies Board (now the Judicial College) and their Equal Treatment Advisory 
Committee through which I provided information and training to judges on disability 
issues. 
                                                          
5 See Hillingdon London Borough Council v Neary [2011] EWHC 1377 (COP). 
6 Cheshire West and Cheshire Council v P [2011] EWHC Civ 1257, overturned by the Supreme Court. 
It is the existence of a deprivation that is relevant, not the reason for it. 
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When human rights ‘came home’ with the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 I 
complained that the Court of Protection as then constituted under the Mental Health 
Act was not compliant because apart from the Master it was run by nominated officers 
with the courtesy title of ‘Assistant Master’ who lacked the independence of a judge. 
Also a court that sat only in London was not accessible to elderly and disabled people 
in the north of the country. Shortly thereafter I was appointed a Deputy Master to hear 
cases at my court in Preston, Lancashire and subsequently I was involved in setting 
up the new Court of Protection under the Mental Capacity Act 2005.  
 
How does this relate to Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards?  
 
As a nominated Judge of the Court of Protection I inevitably became involved in 
deprivation of liberty situations although challenges under the DoLS procedure were 
initially reserved to High Court Judges. It seemed to me that if a care plan was in the 
best interests of an incapacitated person, any deprivation of liberty would be justified 
so I concentrated on the former and treated DoLS as a parallel path that would only 
concern the Court if there was a specific challenge. The problem then became that 
one was restricted to that which the relevant authority was prepared to fund. In many 
cases the Court seemed impotent to achieve its view of best interests especially when 
only one care option was available. In one of my final cases where I had expressed 
unresolved concerns I threatened to invite the press to the next hearing on the basis 
that the court of public opinion may be more powerful than my own role.  
 
Yet despite my extra-judicial experience I did not feel best placed to decide what care 
provision would be in the best interests of the incapacitated person, and had to remind 
myself that my judicial role was not to dictate that such provision be provided but 
merely to ensure that decisions made for the individual were in his or her best interests. 
In that respect the incapacitated person was in the same position, no better and no 
worse, than any other person in seeking adequate care provision. One can only 
choose from that which is, or might be, available. However, the DoLS amendment 
extended the judicial role to determining whether any deprivation of liberty was in the 
best interests of the individual and that widened the powers of the Court considerably 
because a refusal to accept the extent of the deprivation obliges the provider to 
reconsider the care arrangements. 
 
IV. A RETIRED LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
I am now retired and living with my wife of almost 45 years who has Parkinson’s 
disease. We are apprehensive about the future together and then perhaps for one of 
us alone. If we cannot cope due to physical or mental infirmity we shall become 
dependent on others, a situation we have not faced since childhood and do not relish. 
We do not wish to be a burden to our daughters or to be kept alive by medical care if 
the quality of our lives cannot be preserved. We may even become consumers of the 
mental capacity jurisdiction! I became responsible for my mother who spent her last 
years in a nursing home and died there in 2013 at the age of 97 years. I knew that she 
was receiving the best care available because I had arranged it for her. These 
experiences made me painfully aware that it is for the benefit of such persons, and not 
the lawyers, that the jurisdiction exists. I find myself reflecting on what has been 
[2016] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
105 
 
achieved, less defensive of the Court of Protection and more willing to identify its 
failings. 
 
How does this relate to Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards?  
 
Should I have been concerned about deprivation of liberty when I visited my mother 
and found her sitting in her room alone or ‘confined to bed’? My thoughts related more 
to the quality of her care and whether the staff were being kind to her because she 
needed guidance and support rather than freedom. I would have been angry at the 
intrusion and waste of resources if people unknown to me had wished to carry out a 
fruitless annual enquiry as to whether she was unlawfully being deprived of her liberty. 
I do not worry about being deprived of my own liberty in the event that I become infirm 
and lack capacity just as long as good quality care is provided by people who treat me 
with respect and create opportunities for me to enjoy some activity. Being cared for by 
uncaring persons but with more freedom than one could cope with would be a worse 
fate than being excessively restricted by persons providing loving even though 
misplaced care. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Entrenched human rights are necessary to preserve a free society but the framers of 
the European Convention could hardly have anticipated that they would be applied 
with such intensity in these situations. The Human Rights Act 1998 made the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 necessary but has it now become a threat to this jurisdiction? Of 
course the incapacitated individual is vulnerable to inappropriate confinement, and we 
need judicial procedures to prevent people from being wrongly declared as incapable 
and then deprived of their liberty. Enforceability of human rights then becomes 
important, but the obsession of lawyers with the prospect of deprivations of liberty in 
every case results in a clash of objectives with too much emphasis being placed on 
personal freedom and too little on the need for support or supervision. The cost of this 
in terms of financial and professional resources is enormous and in times of austerity 
inevitably depletes the budget for the delivery of care. How much of our limited 
resources are we to devote to that issue when the real question is whether the care 
plan and the way it is being implemented is in the best interests of the individual?  
 
The underlying problem with a rights based approach is that it focuses solely on rights 
and life is not like this. With rights come responsibilities to oneself, one’s family, one’s 
carers and society. None of us have total freedom to exercise our rights as we need 
to be heedful of the needs of others. Those who lack decision-making capacity are 
unlikely to be mindful of these natural constraints. Why should they be treated as 
released from them in the decision-making process and thereby become entitled to 
have everything their own way? The person who constantly says ‘I know my rights’ 
provokes other people to keep their distance which is not in the best interests of that 
person. This brings us back to the delicate balance between empowerment and 
protection. There are times when we need to be protected from ourselves and the 
constraints of our normal personal relationships often have this outcome. If we lack 
the capacity to recognise and respond to those constraints we would surely expect 
that they would be applied externally in any decision-making process. The notion that 
I should have a supporter who ascertains what I want so that this can be demanded 
on my behalf is not one to which I would wish to subscribe. If as a result of a lack of 
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awareness or judgment I wished to give all my money away I would not expect this to 
be the decision made on my behalf even though if I did not lack capacity I would have 
the legal right to do so. A supporter may recognise this but in seeking to exert influence 
would perhaps be going beyond the true role of a supporter and would be moving 
towards a ‘best interests’ approach to decision-making without the safeguards of the 
statutory criteria. 
 
I have no wish to condemn the procedures that we have without offering a viable 
alternative. I would sooner concentrate on the enforceability of human rights where 
appropriate than universal enforcement. Otherwise the emphasis in care provision for 
those lacking capacity becomes minimum restriction rather than maximum support. I 
favour a whistle-blowing procedure to protect those who may be deprived of more 
liberty than is necessary, but with someone in authority capable of responding by 
making a reference to the Court of Protection for judicial scrutiny. There should be 
widespread public knowledge of this procedure as part of the culture of care so that 
relatives and concerned persons may blow the whistle, and a designated local official 
to monitor the care of those who have no such contacts. Resources would then be 
reserved for those who needed protection. 
 
During the past 25 years I have campaigned for this jurisdiction, participated with the 
Law Commission to achieve it and then worked in the judicial system to implement it. 
Has my dream become a nightmare? I respect the impeccable logic of the Appeal 
Courts in applying the broad principles of international Conventions but wonder 
whether in days of austerity our society can afford to deliver such an idealistic 
approach. It seems out of touch with the reality of life as an involuntary carer faced 
with expectations but insufficient support from the authorities, whose right to personal 
freedom must not be overborne by the similar right of the one cared for. I conclude this 
contribution with the words that I have used in many of my lectures over these years: 
“The structure is there but it all depends on how we, the lawyers and other 
professionals, implement the legislation – pragmatic or legalistic?” 
